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Run or Hide: Changes in Acquisition Behaviour During the Covid-19 
Pandemic 
 
Purpose: M&A are an important strategic tool for continuous adaptation, sustainable 
corporate development, and external growth. At the same time, M&A involve high levels of 
risk with mixed performance results even under normal circumstances. Even though the M&A 
market was continuously growing for the last decade, it was abruptly ended by the Covid-19 
pandemic as executives were more concerned about liquidity than with long term growth 
strategies. This raises the question how M&A behaviour is affected by the economic fall-out 
of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Design/methodology/approach: Mixed method research design 
Findings: We particularly investigate how target selection as well as synergy management 
are affected by the pandemic. Our analysis reveals four archetypical responses to the Covid-
19 crisis. We describe those responses in detail and analyze antecedents that seem to influence 
firms’ acquisition behaviour during the pandemic. 
Originality: The paper draws on survey and interview data of M&A practitioners 
 






The Covid-19 pandemic resulted in one of the most severe economic shocks since the Great 
Depression. While a small number of technology firms seem to have sailed through this crisis 
unscathed, most industries and companies are substantially affected as lockdowns caused a 
collapse in investments, travel, and consumer spending. This raises an important issue: How 
are companies responding to this socio-economic crisis? Such responses may, of course take 
different forms. On the one hand, firms will need to ensure short and medium-term survival 
(D’Aveni and MacMillan, 1990; McKinley, 1993; McKinley et al., 2014), yet they may also 
have their sight on the competitive situation once the pandemic is resolved (Katila and Ahuja, 
2002). In this paper, we investigate a particular type of organizational activity: Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A). M&A are a central mechanism for firms to consolidate (Cummins, 
Tennyson & Weiss, 1999), diversify their portfolio (Graham et al., 2002), or acquire new 
technologies and organisational capabilities for growth (Puranam, Singh & Zollo, 2006). 
Interestingly, there is evidence that firms with regular M&A activities can add the needed 
variation to their business models and thus, show increased survival rates (Almor, et al. 2014). 
However, despite the opportunities they offer, M&A are risky due to the high level of 
investment required, but also due to the intricacies of post-merger integration (Bauer & Matzler, 
2014).  
Even though the M&A market was continuously growing for the last decade, it has always 
been a cyclical market, and boom periods were usually slowed down by regulatory changes or 
economic downturns (Park & Gould, 2017). The most recent wave started in 2014 and was 
abruptly ended by the Covid-19 pandemic as executives were more concerned about liquidity 
than with long term growth strategies, and many deals such as Xerox’ acquisition of HP were 
cancelled (Harroch, 2020). Simply, the M&A market has changed. While in the past years, 
M&A could be characterized as a seller’s market, Covid-19 has changed it into a buyer’s market 
as cheap assets and distressed firms became available (Galpin and Mayer, 2020). The past M&A 
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waves differed regarding the underlying acquisition motives and strategies (Ranft and Lord, 
2002). Due to the current changes in the market for corporate control, we argue that, like in 
previous economic crises, firms’ strategies may have changed. This also implies changes in 
acquisition strategies, in particular target identification and the linkage to appropriate 
integration approaches (Brueller, Carmeli and Markman, 2016). This linkage is important as 
finding the right target only refers to opportunity recognition. The actual value creation  occurs 
during integration (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991) which refers to opportunity capture 
(Angwin, 2007). Drawing on the theoretical tension highlighted above, we explore how and 
why firms’ M&A strategies and the corresponding acquisition behaviour have changed during 
the Covid-19 pandemic. 
This paper reports findings of an exploratory, mixed-method research design. On the one 
hand, we draw on survey data of 107 Germanic and UK companies. This survey has focused 
on managers’ perception of Covid-19 related changes in firms’ acquisition strategies, their 
target identification approaches, and synergy realisation goals. The survey evidence is 
supplemented with interview data from CEOs and VPs in charge of M&A as well as M&A 
consultants. These interviews provide further insights into the reasons for changes in M&A 
activity due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Our analysis has revealed four archetypes on how firms’ 
goal systems have changed that impact acquisition behaviour differently.  
The inconclusiveness of prior research with regard to crisis responses is mirrored in the 
four strategy archetypes that also impact M&A behaviour significantly. Based on these 
findings, our study offers new explanatory means to crisis responses, particularly focussed on 
M&A activities. Specifically, we reveal that a firm’s governance mode substantially influences 
how firms respond to crises, independent of managerial experience in Mergers and 
Acquisitions. Moreover, our findings have substantial managerial and policy implications.   
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Theoretical background: Target selection and synergy management in 
situations of economic threats 
This paper explores how and why firms’ acquisition behaviour in terms of target screening as 
well as synergy management has changed as a response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Indeed, the 
economic shock caused by the Covid-19 pandemic results in a rewiring of economic activities 
across the globe, now often referred to by the shorthand ‘new normal’. These changes refer to 
a reduced level of economic activity across many sectors, which might be here to stay for the 
near future; the Economist framed this issue as the challenge of a 90% economy (The 
Economist, 2020). Yet, these changes are also manifest in the very activities through which 
day-to-day management is carried out. The most visible implications were changes in work 
patterns as working from home became the new normal. These examples provide anecdotal 
evidence for the wide-ranging changes that require adaptation to ensure businesses’ future 
viability. A particular form of strategic activity affected by the Covid-19 pandemic is M&A; 
acrucial means of corporate development. While the Financial Press suggests that even later 
stage deals were called off (e.g. Xerox and HP) due to the economic uncertainty created by 
Covid-19, some firms have still engaged in substantial M&A activity (e.g. Boohoo acquired 
Oasis and Warehouse; Uber acquired Autocab). Interestingly, it is worth noting that company 
valuations and corresponding deal multiples were an all-time high before the start of the 
pandemic in 2019. These valuations dropped with the beginning of the pandemic, offering 
various acquisition opportunities that were not feasible before (Grant Thornton, 2020). This 
made company valuations even more subjective.   
Similar to firm goals, acquisition goals are dynamic and are affected by history and context 
(King et al., 2018). In line with the anecdotal evidence from the media, we argue that the Covid-
19 pandemic may have changed acquisition behaviour and in particular two major steps of the 
M&A process: first, how firms recognize opportunities and identify appropriate target firms 
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and second, how firms try to capture opportunities through synergies and especially through 
changes in their synergy goals.  
Target identification and integration relate to information about a potential target firm and 
the acquirer's confidence in the ability for joint value creation after deal closing (Agrawal et al., 
2017). Acquirers identify or recognize potential target firms in different ways. They might act 
opportunistically often externally triggered by investment banks or consultants  or they might 
act strategically, driven by a firm’s M&A department. These different approaches have distinct 
advantages and disadvantages. Opportunistically driven approaches are outside of a firm’s 
control (Dawson, 2001). In M&A, this refers to cases when a target directly approaches a 
potential acquirer or an acquirer simply identifies an opportunity (e.g., lacking business 
succession or imminent liquidity problems of business partners). Opportunistically driven 
acquisitions are common among many firms, especially in times of turbulence (for the retail 
industry see e.g. Dawson, 2001) but tend to be more of an issue for smaller or mid-sized 
acquirers as they are usually cheaper compared to the other two screening options. Additionally, 
smaller firms are usually less rigid regarding their governance structure and especially with 
owner-led firms; the pressure to justify decisions is lower. However, the information asymmetry 
between acquirer and seller and the asymmetry of the limited search scope and the potential 
market for an appropriate target, raises the question if an opportunistically driven approach 
allows firms to identify the best target. 
Contrary, externally driven approaches, where consultants or investment banks provide 
proposals for target firms, are seemingly more transparent and aim to reduce information 
asymmetry. Furthermore, consultants and investment banks usually have a broader search scope 
and base their analysis on comprehensive databases supplemented with information by industry 
and M&A experts. Two advantages emerge out of this approach: acquirers know that these 
targets are up for sale and, therefore, that this search process is usually faster than an internal 
search approach. However, externally driven M&A screenings face serious principal-agency 
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problems, as consultants as well as investment banks usually receive a share of the purchase 
price as remuneration. As such, they (agent) might exploit their private knowledge to benefit 
from an acquisition while the acquirer (principal) suffers from limited control possibilities 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Lastly, firms can find appropriate targets through internal search processes where an M&A 
function or M&A department gathers information, conducts the analysis, and provides business 
cases to decision-makers (Trichterborn et al., 2016). A clear advantage of internally driven 
approaches is that managers are more comprehensively informed about the acquisition strategy 
of the acquirer and operationalize the strategy in search criteria. Here, acquisition experience 
might help to improve target selection processes, but might also result in rigidity. Additionally, 
internal search approaches might be affected by the ‘streetlight’ effect, limiting the search scope 
for appropriate targets massively.  
Combined, the three alternative approaches to target screening offer different advantages 
and disadvantages in opportunity recognition. Also, they might be appropriate at different times 
for different types of firms. For example, firms whose management is absorbed by managing 
the survival through the Covid-19 pandemic might not rely on complex and long term internal 
search approaches but find it more time-efficient and cost-effective to receive proposals from 
investment banks and consultants. Contrary, firms might prefer to dive into search processes 
themselves in order to receive first-hand insights about market movements for identifying 
competitive advantage and for avoiding auctions.  
While target screening refers to opportunity recognition, opportunities are captured and 
only materialize during integration, when the acquirer and the target are combined (Graebner, 
Heimeriks, Huy and Vaara, 2017). In this respect, managers usually refer to the bottom line and 
top line synergies (Herd, Saksena and Steger, 2005). The former result from standardization 
that allow firms to cut costs, the latter ones refer to coordination and integration that should 
result in increased revenues (Graebner et al., 2017). However, predicting and realising 
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synergies involves uncertainty (Schijven and Hitt, 2012) due to limited data (Garzella and 
Fiorentino, 2014), vagueness (Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 2000), and the time distance of 
planning and realisation (Cording et al., 2008). While top line synergies offer greater synergy 
potential, managers often pursue bottom line synergies as they show immediate performance 
effects. Previous research has highlighted the conflicts of interest in realising synergies, for 
example financial versus strategic synergies (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson and Moesel, 1996) or 
cost-cutting versus long term strategic synergies (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006). As company 
goals are dynamic, acquisition goals and also synergy goals might change. For instance, the 
Covid-19 pandemic might force firms to focus on cost synergies to maintain or generate 
liquidity needed to survive, potentially at the expense of revenue synergies that might affect 
firm performance in the recovery period after the economic shock.  
Methodology 
This paper is based on a mixed-method, explorative research design, combining both a survey 
as well as interviews with M&A practitioners. While the survey allows us to unpack patterns 
of responses across a broader sample of firms, the interviews with M&A practitioners provide 
a more nuanced view of why firms pursue particular target screening and synergy management 
approaches.  
Data collection 
Data collection involved two main primary sources. On the one hand, we collected primary data 
with an online questionnaire. We pretested our questionnaire with three M&A managers in late 
June before we sent out the survey in the beginning of July 2020. Like previous research 
(Ahammad et al., 2017), we used LinkedIn to distribute our survey in the Germanic countries 
and the UK, and we addressed managers responsible for M&A management and decisions. 
LinkedIn is suitable as it provides more current and accurate career information than other 
8 
 
databases (Ge et al., 2016). After one week, we posted a reminder. Ina two weeks period, we 
could gather 107 completed questionnaires. The following Table 1 shows our sample.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
As the Covid-19 situation and the political measures that could restrict or ease business 
activities change rapidly, we compared early and late respondents of our survey. As such, we 
compared the early and late respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977), and the results of an 
independent sample t-test reveal no significant differences. Additionally, our survey data might 
be affected by common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). We implemented various 
procedural steps and applied Harman’s single factor test (Podsakoff et al., 2003) to identify a 
potential bias. The result reveals no serious issues for our data.  
Another data source included 21 interviews with M&A practitioners. This involved VPs of 
M&A of firms belonging to the German ‘Mittelstand’ and large, listed corporations, UK firms 
as well as consultants. The focus of the interviews was to get a better understanding of how 
firms were affected by Covid-19, how they saw the acquisition landscape going forward and 
how their approach to managing acquisitions has changed. Interviews were conducted via 
telephone or video-conferencing and lasted between 30 and 90 minutes.  
Survey measures 
For measurement development, we needed to develop new measures for our quadrant solution, 
target screening approaches, and bottom line and top line synergies. In doing so, we followed 
a four-step process. First, we defined the constructs of interest for our survey. Based on this 
work, we second screened the M&A and strategic alliance literature for prior 
operationalizations and indicators. Based on this review of the literature, we created a 
comprehensive item pool. In a third step, we discussed this item pool with managers. Initially, 
we asked them to focus on the clarity of formulations of the indicators and potential 
redundancies. Additionally, after reducing the number of indicators we randomly arranged them 
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and asked managers to organize them into the predefined constructs. Lastly, after finalizing the 
survey instrument we tested all measures during a pretest with M&A managers.  
Survival through a focus on efficiency goals was assessed with four items. We asked 
managers how the Covid-19 pandemic has changed company goals (operative margins, 
EBITDA, liquidity, and asset turnover) regarding their importance on a scale from 1=much less 
important, 3=similarly as before, to 5=much more important (Alpha = 0.719). Surviving 
through a focus on Risk and Growth was assessed on a similar scale but assessing changes in 
market share, revenue, and equity ratio goals (Alpha = 0.560). 
Crisis coping was assessed with three indicators assessing whether the firm of the 
respondent can, despite the Covid crisis, react quickly to opportunities, engage in promising 
opportunities, and use potentials and convert them into a competitive advantage. We applied a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from 1=I strongly disagree to 5=I strongly agree (Alpha = 
0.968). 
M&A associated risks were assessed with four items (Firms that are now actively 
buying…: Increase their risk massively; Bet on the wrong horse; Should better wait and see; 
Take the risk of paying too high multiples) on a five-point Likert scale (Alpha = 0.870). M&A 
associated benefits were assessed on a similar scale with five indicators (Firms that are now 
actively buying…: Are one step ahead of their competitors; Can enter new markets; Are making 
use of the right time; Can acquire true bargains; Prepare themselves actively for the future) 
(Alpha = 0.940). 
Investment and expenses activities were assessed with single items as outlined below on a 
five-point Likert scale. Target screening approaches were assessed with two indicators for 
opportunistically driven, and three indicators for externally (Alpha = 0.623) and internally 
driven (Alpha = 0.868) approaches. In detail, we asked how firms find suitable targets during 
the Covid-19 pandemic. 
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Changes in bottom line synergies were assessed with four indicators asking respondents 
how priorities (cost reduction through redundancies, supply chain synergies, cost reduction in 
IT infrastructure, and cost reduction in purchasing) have changed during the Covid-19 
pandemic on a five-point scale (Alpha = 0.877). 
Changes in top line synergies were assessed with six indicators (Synergies in operating 
models, synergies in sales channels, price increase potential, new market potential, 
development of new capabilities, scaling the business) on the same scale as bottom line 
synergies (Alpha = 0.868). All other measures were single item measures as described below. 
To develop the different archetypes, we calculated the dominant direction of the goal shift, 
either towards “surviving through efficiency goals” or towards “surviving through risk and 
growth” by calculating the difference of both scales. We coded those firms, who’s dominant 
direction was only marginal (difference values ranging from -0.5 to 0.5). Based on the mean 
value of both goal dimensions and the dominant direction of the goal shift, we categorized firms 
into four quadrants, showing the different goal shift options for firms.  
Data analysis 
In our data analysis followed three main steps that can be characterized as descriptive and 
exploratory. For the analysis, we mainly rely on mean value comparisons of different groups. 
In the first step of data analysis, we drew on the survey data in order to explore different patterns 
of M&A behaviour, based on two criteria: the extent to which firms followed cost saving and 
efficiency goals and / or the extent of risk taking. This resulted in four archetypes of acquisition 
behaviour (See Figure 1 below). In the second step of data analysis we then analysed how these 
archetypes differed in terms of target screening as well as synergy management approaches. In 
a third step, we further explored antecedents of these archetypical responses by investigating 
differences in firm characteristics. This step revealed that firms’ governance modes (listed vs. 
medium sized firms) seemed to play an important role. Finally, we used the four archetypes as 
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categories in order to analyse our interview data. We sorted interviewees based on these 
archetypes. We then focused on statements that would provide reasons and justifications for 
target screening and synergy management approaches as well as gave insights into antecedents 
of acquisition behaviour.  
Four M&A coping strategies during Covid-19 
Based on the two dimensions, “surviving through efficiency goals” and “surviving through risk 
and growth”, our data shows four different archetypes of coping behaviour with the crisis. We 
call them hide, run, cost, and marathon strategies. These four strategy approaches differ 
significantly regarding the overall crisis coping but also if acquisitions are seen as a “pure risk” 
or as an opportunity. Below we describe the main characteristics of these strategies and also 
provide further evidence based on interviews with M&A practitioners (see Figure 1). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Hide strategy: Nearly 30% of the responding firms pursue a “hide strategy” during the 
crisis. They are slow in responding to opportunities or do not engage with them. Additionally, 
these firms are not able to use potentials and convert them into competitive advantages. With 
regards to M&A, they see acquisitions dominantly as a major risk during the current crisis that 
offer only very limited opportunities. This situation can be illustrated by a quote from Thomas, 
Head of M&A of a hide-strategy firm says: “We are not only on furlough, the whole M&A 
department is on compulsory leave. Acquisitions were stopped – even those ones shortly before 
signing. […] Of course, we do have a slump of incoming orders by 11% and a drop in sales by 
8%. However, this is nothing compared to other players in our industry (such as machine 
manufacturers)! We won’t get involved into any M&A activities before autumn, all teams are 
working too isolated from each other.” 
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Cost strategy: Contrary, firms with a more conservative “cost strategy” that account for 
31.5% of the responding firms focus on stability, which allows them to generate sufficient cash 
to react. Fritz, M&A practitioner, talks about how a cost focus influences M&A activity in his 
firm: “We have stopped current screening activities, actually all M&A activities apart from 
integration. Due to employees being on furlough we wouldn’t be able to manage these activities 
from remote and so our strategists support other departments in operations. Concerning our 
general M&A strategy the only thing we are constantly doing is having meetings with 
investment banks and M&A consultancies for observing developments in our industry, and also 
to see whether good bargains pop up which allow us some bottom line synergies”. 
Run strategy: With regards to crisis coping and acquisitions, these approaches are rather 
similar to the “run strategy” firms, that count for only 11.1% of the responding firms. Both see 
rather little risk in acquisitions. The mean for the risk items ranges from 2.3 (cost strategy) to 
2.0 (run strategy) on a 5-point scale. Additionally, “run strategy” firms see the greatest 
opportunities in acquisitions. This optimistic outlook is evident in the interview with Maria, 
whose firm has adopted a run strategy in order to cope with the crisis: “I think that the M&A 
market will quickly return being a seller market. Working from home does not change anything 
at all for our workflows. Our acquisition strategy has not changed severely, quite the contrary, 
the identification process of new growth opportunities is on full blast in light of the crisis.” 
Marathon strategy: Finally, firms that changed their goals systems in a more balanced way 
into a “marathon strategy” constitute 26.9% of our sample. Similar to their more balanced 
changes in goal systems, they see risks and opportunities through acquisitions more balanced 
than the other firms. Martin, executive in an engineering firm, explains: “Overall, our screening 
strategy did not change at all, meaning we are still hanging on to our deal book. However, what 
is more is that we see new opportunities on a daily basis due to the Corona crisis and 
immediately get in touch with potential targets.” 
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The different strategies also impact investment activities as well as expenses management. 
While on average, all firms of our sample reduced their expenses during the crisis, there are 
significant differences among the four different archetypes. While firms applying the ‘hide 
strategy’ strongly reduce technology expenses, investments in general, and marketing and 
employee expenses, only firms with the ‘marathon strategy’ and the ‘run strategy’ increase their 
technology expenses. However, the latter three reduce their expenses and investments only by 
a small degree. The following Figure 2 visualises how firms changed their investment activities 
and their expenses during the Covid-10 crisis. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
The different strategies can again be illustrated by evidence from interviews from M&A 
practitioners: “Everything here is focused on saving costs”, highlighted Thomas, executive in 
firm pursuing a ‘hide strategy’, “even in the strategy department headcounts were reduced”. 
In contrast, Maria Senior VP in a pharmaceutical firm which adopted a ‘run strategy’ reveals 
that rather than spending cuts the firm increased investment: “We are currently spending more 
in technological fields where we see a huge growth potential – both independently from the 
Covid-19 pandemic, but also into fields that are directly affected by the crisis such as life 
sciences.” This, again, is different to firms pursuing a cost strategy’ as explained by an 
executive: “we need to run on sight, permanently adapting our operating activities and we need 
to be careful with our expenses.” Finally, the balanced approach of the ‘marathon strategy’ is 
evident in an interview with Martin, Head of M&A. While the firm needs to be cost-conscious, 
they are mindful that the firm needs to preserve its competitive edge: “Of course, we are 
tightening our belt – top level management salaries, travel expenses, etc.; everything that 




Firm acquisition behaviour per strategy 
Our findings suggest that acquisition behaviour also relates to opportunity recognition and 
opportunity capture. Opportunity recognition in acquisitions refers to how firms identify 
potential target firms for an acquisition and opportunity capture, how firms intend to realise 
synergies. Interestingly, the strategy archetypes affect not only target screening but also their 
focus on synergies.  
How do firms approach potential target firms during Covid-19? 
Target screening refers to the pre-merger stage, in which firms aim to identify potential 
companies to acquire. While the European market for M&A was a clear seller market in the 
past decade, Covid-19 has dramatically changed the situation, and reduced multiples firms are 
willing to pay as well as the number of available firms. Especially firms in financial distress are 
now on the market for corporate control. Independent from external adversities, there are three 
common approaches to target screening. While the approaches have not changed during the 
crisis, the importance of these approaches has changed. Generally, targets can be identified with 
an opportunistically driven approach, or when potential targets directly approach potential 
acquirers, externally driven approaches through investment banks or consultants, and internally 
driven approaches by a dedicated M&A department or top managers. A summary is provided 
in Figure 3. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Interestingly, we find no major changes as well as no significant differences between the 
four strategy archetypes regarding an opportunistically driven screening approach. Even though 
firms with a ‘hide strategy’ tend to rely much more on this approach, the absolute differences 
among the archetypes are not significant. Externalised target screening approaches through 
investment banks and consultants seems less important for all strategy archetypes but ‘run 
strategy’ firms. This indicates that ‘run strategy’ firms try to recognise and capture all possible 
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opportunities, followed by ‘cost strategy’ firms. This can be illustrated by the following quote 
from a ‘run strategy’ firm: “We have increased our search scope and intensified our screening 
activities because we do not only consider M&A as an important pillar in our growth 
endeavours”. 
For ‘hide strategy’ and ‘marathon strategy’ firms, externalised target screening seems not 
appropriate. On the one hand, these firms might want to gather insights about their core and 
adjacent markets for creating insights as well as sensing and seizing opportunities as early as 
possible. On the other hand, this might be due to the higher costs of this screening approach 
that derive from fees that are coupled to the deal value or simply that these firms do not trust 
externals with strategic decisions. This is illustrated in the following quote by Martin, an 
executive in a ‘marathon strategy’ firm: “we still hold on to our internal screening approach – 
we receive business opportunities from external agencies, but the major part is done by 
ourselves.” We also find that ‘cost strategy’, ‘run strategy’, and ‘marathon strategy’ firms 
strongly rely on their internal approaches to target screening. They have the impression that 
their M&A department is ahead of the game or that their screening approach is robust during 
the crisis; “we are well prepared” an M&A executive from a ‘marathon strategy’ firm put it. 
The following figure visualises the different search approaches. 
Which synergies have gained importance? 
After an acquisition, firms aim to capture opportunities by realising synergies. Synergies 
constitute the major value creation mechanism in acquisitions (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). 
Managers usually refer to two types of synergies, bottom line and top line synergies (e.g. Herd, 
Saksena and Steger, 2005). The different strategy archetypes also significantly changed their 
synergy goals for acquisitions. An overview is provided in Figure 4.  
------------------------------- 




While ‘hide strategy’ firms now focus dominantly on bottom line synergies that are e.g. 
redundancies, purchasing synergies, synergies in the supply chain, or cost reductions in the 
infrastructure, top line synergies have lost in importance. Thomas, Head of M&A, explains: 
“We currently only focus on cost-cutting in our operations […] I expect cost synergies to be 
the prioritized argument, once we restart our M&A activities.” For firms following a ‘cost 
strategy’, bottom line synergies experience greater importance than top line synergies. Fritz, 
Head of Corporate Development, reveals why this is the case for his firm: “Of course, right 
now it’s easier to generate a business case based on operational synergies. Everything else 
would be too risky. We need to wait and see how the markets will be affected by the Corona 
crisis to have a better sense of both multiples and synergy potential for our own business.” 
Contrary, firms pursuing a “run strategy” focus now, especially on top line synergies. 
Maria, SVP Corporate Development of a Run Strategy, highlights this opportunity driven approach: 
“Good bargains will become evident quite quickly, and we are very efficient in identifying these 
opportunities and calculating these business cases. Our team is already in the starting gate for 
hunting down first crisis-ridden firms that reach out for help.” Finally, firms with a “marathon 
strategy” show an increase in importance but also a better balance in both, bottom line and top 
line synergies. We again draw on Martin’s interview in order to provide further detail for this 
point: “We have a clear picture of strategic and operational synergies that we want to achieve 
with our acquisitions. Every growth field has criteria in terms of strategic fit, financial 
attractiveness and feasibility – and expected synergies accordingly.” 
What explains firms’ M&A approaches during the crisis? 
We also explored two factors that are likely determinants for M&A behaviour. Our analysis 
reveals two key drivers: experience and governance. 
What do experienced acquirers do differently? 
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Interestingly, we find no significant differences concerning acquisition experience and strategic 
behaviour. The four strategy archetypes do not significantly differ from each other regarding 
previous acquisitions. One reason might be that the current crisis differs from previous 
economic crises in terms of predictability. As firms had in the best-case one or two months to 
get prepared for this crisis, the consequences have not been clear at any point in time. The 
newness of the situation might also explain why firms cannot benefit from prior experiences 
and capabilities. While most experiences were made in a period of economic growth, firms are 
now confronted with an abrupt downturn. As such, their experiences might simply not fit to the 
current situation. A statement of one of our interviewees illustrates this point: “I am responsible 
for M&A since more than 18 years now and have experienced the effects of the financial crisis 
2007/08. What we are currently confronted in the aftermath of the Corona crisis seems to be 
entirely different from our previous experiences…” (Martin, Head of M&A of Marathon 
strategy). 
Governance matters: Owner-run vs. listed firms 
Our sample consists of mid-cap as well as corporate acquirers. Mid-cap firms in our sample are 
owner-run businesses with an entrepreneurial character, corporates are listed on the stock 
market and usually have tight control mechanisms in place like a supervisory board. We find 
that there is a significant difference between mid-cap and corporate acquirers regarding the 
strategic choices. Mid-cap acquirers strongly focus on either ‘hide’ or ‘run strategies’. Both of  
these strategic options are less prevalent for corporates in our sample. Indeed, mid-caps account 
for 90% of the firms pursuing a ‘hide strategy’ and 70% pursuing a ‘run strategy’, respectively.  
‘Cost’ and ‘Marathon’ strategies were mostly deployed by listed corporates in our sample. 
Nearly 50% of all corporates follow a ‘cost strategy’ and they represent nearly 84% of the firms 
pursuing this strategy. The ‘marathon strategy’ is pursued by 40% of all corporates in our 
sample but only by 17% of the mid-cap firms. Put differently, from all firms pursuing a 
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‘marathon strategy’, nearly 70% are corporates while only 30% are mid-cap firms. The results 
are visualised in Figure 5. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The Covid-19 pandemic has deeply affected economies around the globe. In the short term, 
firms have to deal with the threat of survival. Yet, how firms respond to this threat is also crucial 
for firm’s long term development. So, what do we learn about M&A activities during crises?  
First, research on responses to crisis and external threats is inconclusive. While firms may 
react to threat situations with rigidity, the opposite might also be the case (McKinley, 2014). 
Our findings contribute to this debate by looking at a specific aspect of managerial activity, 
M&A. The different responses highlighted in extant theory are mirrored in our four archetypes. 
Importantly, our paper provides tentative evidence of potential antecedents, such as firms’ 
governance type, that help explaining why firms may react differently to the same type of threat. 
This evidence is indeed tentative as we only have acquirers from two countries in our sample, 
and we also do not control for different acquisition types. Still, our data suggests that a firm’s 
governance mode seems to be highly influential regarding the level of risk a firm is willing 
(and/or able) to take and, consequently, how they see the role of acquisitions going forward. 
While we do not have specific information on the detailed governance regime of the firms in 
our sample (for instance, with regard to board structures or incentives), prior research shows 
that governance substantially influences the role and responsibilities of different stakeholders 
(Lubatkin, Jane, Collin and Very, 2007). In this respect, our findings particularly highlight the 
differences between mid-caps and listed corporations in their M&A approach during the 
pandemic. Indeed, the mid-caps in our sample are mostly owner-run or family businesses, while 
the corporate acquirers are largely listed with institutional shareholders. In line with previous 
research, our findings show that ownership impacts strategic conduct (Amihud & Lev, 1999) 
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and also performance (Thomson & Pedersen, 2000). Thus, differences in ownership and the 
different strategic preferences manifest in different governance types, might explain the relative 
polarization of the run / hide as well as the cost / marathon strategies.  
Second, prior research suggests that acquisition experience and hence the level of 
acquisition capability should substantially influence how firms respond to threat situations 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Experiecned acquirers often have 
capabilities in terms of M&A departments (Trichterborn et al., 2016) as well as professionalized 
routines for M&A (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Heimeriks et al., 2012), that, in combination, should 
make them more resilient in times of crisis. Indeed, based on such capabilities firms with 
substantial M&A experience might foreground the opportunities related to potential deals rather 
than the financial downsides, giving rise to more risk-taking and thus more proactive and less 
opportunistic acquisition behaviour. Interestingly, our data does not support this argument. The 
four archetypes do not significantly differ with regard to the acquisition experience of the 
underlying firms. While this could potentially be an artefact of our sample, there might also be 
theoretical reasons for why this is the case. Indeed, the last decade has seen an unprecedented 
wave of M&A activity. This implies that many firms have gained M&A experience during a 
buoyant market that could be described as a seller’s market. Such a market might require 
different management approaches compared to the crisis mode triggered by Covid-19. Thus, 
the macro-economic context whithin which acquisition experience was made, might influence 
to what extent managers consider such experience relevant to gauge the risk and strategic 
potential of particular opportunities.  
Third, an important influencing factor of firms’ response to economic shocks is indeed 
whether managers go into crisis mode (Gilbert, 2006). While this might depend on acquisition 
experience, as argued above, it might also depend on other ‘initial conditions’ such as the 
financial resources available or potentially obtainable at the onset of the crisis. Unfortunately, 
we do not have any data on firms’ financial strength prior, nor during the Covid-19 pandemic. 
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So, we can only speculate and raise this point for future research. Anecdotal evidence from the 
financial press suggests that large tech but also retail and oil companies have continued with 
ambitious acquisition programmes (Aliaj et al., 2020). This constitutes a clear limitation of our 
study and future research should address this as well as the long term effects of the different 
strategy archetypes.  
Finally, our paper also has managerial as well as policy implications. First, managers have 
a wide variety of options on how to respond to a crisis. In line with prior research, our findings 
highlight the tension of foregoing future opportunities by suspending strategic thinking during 
times of crisis and hiding and surviving. Here, our results show that those firms who have a 
direction, independent of efficiency or growth targets, cope better with the current crisis. This 
implies that surviving without a purpose is not a solid base for long term strategic development. 
Our findings also have policy implications. While mid-cap firms tend to go for ‘hide’ and ‘run’ 
strategies, corporates rather pursue ‘cost’ or ‘marathon’ strategies. Thus, to increase the impact 
of financial support mechanisms that go beyond immediate survival measures, governments 
need to tailor support programs to different firm types. For instance, while state guarantees or 
loans might increase risk-taking for mid-cap firms (helping them to pursue growth strategies), 
this might be the wrong approach for corporates, whose strategic conduct needs to satisfy a 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Characteristics of sample firms 
Company 
Type 
Firm size in 
employees in % 
Acquisition 
Experience in % Region in % 
Mid-Cap 0-250 19.2 None 3.8 Germanic Countries 56 
Corporate 251-500 7.7 1-2 7.5 UK 44 
 501-1.000 11.5 3-4 30.2   
 1.001-5.000 36.5 5-6 14.2   
 5000-10.000 4 7-8 14.2   
 >10.000 21.1 9-10 8.5   
      >10 21.6     
 
Figure 1. Overview of strategy archetypes 
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Figure 3. M&A search approaches during Covid-19 
 
Figure 4. Acquisition synergy goals 
 
Figure 5. Strategy archetypes and governance mode 
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